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Long before the framers of New Hampshire’s first constitution 
admonished legislatures and magistrates to cherish education, the 
provincial government had already established requirements for 
providing public education; these requirements were related to the 
size of a settlement.1 
By 1708, the provincial government in New Hampshire had 
established the first public school.2  Not surprisingly, the school was 
in Portsmouth, which was, at the time,3 the seat of the provincial 
government.4  On May 2, 1719, the province passed an act that 
required communities of fifty families to employ a school teacher.5  
Under the same act, a community that had one hundred families was 
required to maintain a school.6  Thus, the province established the 
duty to provide access to public education in New Hampshire and 
mandated that the settlements implement it.  Where a child lived was 
the causal connection in the expansion of public education. 
  
 1. See, e.g., Apr. 25, 1721, ch. 3, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 358.  Part II, article 83 
of the New Hampshire Constitution is the state’s educational article for the 
encouragement of literature.  It was the basis for the state’s school funding 
litigation, commonly known as the Claremont decision.  See Claremont Sch. Dist. 
v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993).  This clause was part of the 
original constitution that was adopted in 1784.  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83 annots.  
While this article has been amended twice—once in 1877 to prohibit tax money 
for the funding of schools of religious denominations and again in 1903 to permit 
legislative regulation of monopolies and trusts—the original encouragement of 
literature clause has remained unchanged for 245 years.  Id.  Provincial 
requirements for public education were enacted on May 2, 1719.  Act of May 2, 
1719, ch. 9, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 336. 
 2. Act of May 10, 1708, ch. 5, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 85. 
 3. Id. 
 4. RICHARD F. UPTON, REVOLUTIONARY NEW HAMPSHIRE 2 (Kennikat Press 
1971) (1936). 
 5. Act of May 2, 1719, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws at 337. 
 6. Id. 
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The purpose of this work is to ascertain whether, as a matter of 
public policy, the location in which a student lives should continue 
to determine which public school that student shall attend.  The 
article will first look at the development in, and some of the early 
exceptions to, the residency requirement and how they have affected 
education policy.  Next, it will discuss the role that state and federal 
statutes, court decisions, school funding litigation, technology, and 
current national projects have in modifying a strict reliance on 
residency as the primary factor that decides where students have 
access to public education.  Finally, it will analyze whether the 
reliance on a residency-based public education system continues to 
be justifiable. 
While the focus of this article is on public education in New 
Hampshire, the article also considers statutes and court decisions 
from Florida and Colorado, as well as some federal statutes and 
court decisions, in order to illustrate the general application of this 
analysis to public education nationwide and to demonstrate that the 
New Hampshire experience is not necessarily unique.  There was no 
particular rationale for the choice of states other than to offer a 
limited, but geographically diverse, view as evidence of the parallel 
between the state experience in New Hampshire and that in other 
states, and of the experience at the national level. 
A. The New Hampshire Experience 
The demise of the residency requirement at the federal level 
began in the last quarter of the twentieth century.  In 1975, Congress 
enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.7  
This law created the impetus for school districts to place students 
with a disability in public and private schools and programs outside 
of their resident school district in order to comply with the law’s 
requirement to provide every student with a disability with a free and 
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment.8  
Although this act applied to a small subset of the public school 
population, this was the first major departure from the residency-
  
 7. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–
1482 (2006)). 
 8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(5). 
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based education delivery model.  This option for a small number of 
children has fueled the demand for alternatives for all children.9 
The U.S. Supreme Court followed in 1982 with a decision that 
permitted children of illegal immigrants to attend public schools.10  
In 1987, Congress enacted a law that permitted homeless children 
and unaccompanied youth to attend school wherever they were, 
regardless of residency.11  At the beginning of 2001, No Child Left 
Behind became law and ushered in sanctions for low-performing 
schools; sanctions that included parental choice of a public school 
that was not in need of improvement and additional funding for 
charter schools.12  The following year, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the Ohio voucher program over a challenge based on the 
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.13 
During this same time period, states were enacting laws, in 
response to parental demands, to provide more public alternatives to 
all students; unsuccessfully trying to implement voucher programs 
or defend those already in existence against constitutional 
challenges; and defending their methods of school funding from 
constitutional challenges in both federal and state courts.14 
While no single event would have had much effect on the 
residency-based delivery system, in the aggregate, these events have 
caused a schism in the current system.  The question is: will the 
recognition of this conflict—between the current legal requirement 
  
 9. Parents of children that are not identified with disabilities frequently call the 
Department of Education looking for the same choices in education for their 
children that children with disabilities have.  In some cases, these parents have 
attempted to use administrative due process hearings to obtain benefits similar to 
those available to children identified with disabilities.  E.g., In re Tamworth Sch. 
Dist., Nos. 96-022 & 96-024 (N.H. Bd. of Educ. 1997), http://www.ed.state.nh.us/ 
education/laws/StateBoardDecisionsChronologically.htm. 
 10. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
 11. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance (McKinney-Vento) Act, Pub. L. 
No. 100-77, §§ 721–725, 101 Stat. 482, 525–28 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435). 
 12. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, sec. 101, §§1001–
1004, 115 Stat. 1425, 1439–44 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301–6304). 
 13. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002). 
 14. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); 
Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 
1996); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993). 
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of residency for public school attendance and the commitment to 
public school improvement by authorizing competitive, alternate 
programs—provide the momentum for a wider discussion regarding 
large-scale public school reform? 
II. THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE FOR RESIDENCY 
The general residency criterion for public school attendance in 
New Hampshire currently states: “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no person shall attend school, or send a pupil to the 
school, in any district of which the pupil is not a legal resident, 
without the consent of the district or of the school board . . . .”15 
This standard evolved from the provincial enactment that 
required settlements to provide access to education when they 
attained a particular number of households.16  The initial importance 
of “residence” was that it triggered a community’s social 
responsibility mandated by government.  In the beginning, 
population was the driving force that determined when a community 
was required to offer the rudiments of a public education: first by 
employing a teacher when there were fifty households in a 
settlement, and then by maintaining a school when the number of 
households reached one hundred.17 
Passed on December 23, 1842, chapter 73 of the New Hampshire 
Revised Statutes represented the first codification of the residency 
requirement as determinative of one’s access to public education.18  
Its passage shifted the focus of residency from the trigger-point of a 
community’s obligation to a criterion for access to the public school 
system that was provided by every established community.19  
Chapter 73, section 7 stated: “No person shall have a right to send to 
or receive any benefit from any school in a district in which he is not 
a resident, without the consent of such district.”20 
  
 15. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:12(I) (2008 & Supp. 2009). 
 16. See Act of May 2, 1719, ch. 9, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 336. 
 17. Id. 
 18. N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 7 (1842). 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
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This statutory language memorialized the shift from the point 
where the number of residents in a community activated a social 
responsibility to the point where the social responsibility was now 
limited to the number of residents in a community and others to 
whom they chose to confer the benefit.  This standard has continued, 
largely unchanged, for over a century.21  Thus, residency has become 
the primary criterion for accessing public education.  New 
Hampshire is not unlike other states in this regard.22 
From provincial times until the commencement of New 
Hampshire’s school financing litigation, the primary source of 
funding for public education was local property taxes.23  Once a 
community was large enough to be required to provide public 
education, the government during the colonial period required the 
community to fund it.  When state law established residency as a 
criterion for access to public education, its primacy was no longer 
related to the size of the community.  The concurrent fiscal 
responsibility of each community to pay for public education, as 
well as its social obligation to provide that education for its own 
inhabitants, had been required since 1719.24  Resident-based public 
education became a limiting factor on the social responsibility, as 
well as on the fisc of a community, which required that communities 
educate only those children within their boundaries and allowed 
those communities to choose whether to offer the benefit to others 
beyond their boundaries. 
In addition to limiting the financial impact a community must 
bear, residency had an additional value as a planning tool.  
Community planners were able to collect data on population growth 
and shifts, birth and death rates, available housing units, and 
business and economic trends in order to forecast the increase or 
decline in school populations.  In this way, communities were able to 
  
 21. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:12 (2008 & Supp. 2009) (“[N]o 
person shall attend a school . . . in any district of which the pupil is not a legal 
resident . . . .”), with N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 7 (1842) (“No person shall have a 
right to . . . receive any benefit from any school in a district in which he is not a 
resident . . . .”). 
 22. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 23. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1379–80 (N.H. 1993). 
 24. See Act of May 2, 1719, ch. 9, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 336. 
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plan for: school building projects, which are expensive capital 
investments and take a significant amount of time to complete; the 
need for teachers and textbooks; and other elements necessary to the 
public education delivery system. 
With the benefits of the social and fiscal limitations along with 
the ability to plan for the future, the residency requirement provided 
an aspect of stability that is an essential virtue of public policy.  In a 
period of time when social mobility was relatively rare, this was a 
rational public policy.  In today’s world, where people move 
frequently and regularly, it is appropriate to evaluate whether this 
policy is still well suited to our educational goals.  While there has 
not yet been an organized challenge to the continued legitimacy of 
residency as a primary determinant of access to public education, 
other developments in public education may be eroding the value of 
residency as the access point for public education.  This erosion is, 
perhaps, an unintended consequence of such developments, but it 
should be considered as educators, state and local school boards of 
education, legislators, and other leaders contemplate the future of 
public education in a society that is far more mobile than were the 
societies from the eighteenth century through the middle of the 
twentieth century.  This analysis will look at some of these 
developments. 
III. STATUTES, RULES, AND COURT DECISIONS: THE FACTORS THAT 
UNDERMINE RESIDENCY 
Almost two hundred years after the first school was founded in 
Portsmouth and New Hampshire had required local government to 
provide and pay for public education, the state legislature enacted a 
statute that created a duty on parents requiring that they send their 
children to school.25  Initially, children between the ages of eight and 
fourteen residing in a school district were required to attend school 
unless the local school board excused the attendance due to a 
physical or mental condition or because the child attended a private 
school that was approved by the local board.26  Today, the 
  
 25. Act of Feb. 17, 1903, ch. 13, 1903 N.H. Laws 13. 
 26. Id. 
File: Browning-Finalv.3.doc Created on:  6/20/10 4:46 PM Last Printed: 6/20/10 4:46 PM 
304 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 8, No. 3 
distinction between the school district’s duty to provide public 
education to its residents and a parent’s duty to compel attendance is 
most evident by the fact that these two duties are set out in two 
different chapters of Title XV, the education title, of the Revised 
Statutes Annotated.27 
In less than a decade after enacting the compulsory attendance 
requirement, the New Hampshire legislature carved out the first 
exception to this requirement.28  In 1911, the legislature permitted a 
person having custody or control of a child to apply to the state 
superintendent of public instruction whenever that person believed 
that attending the district school was against the moral or physical 
welfare of the child.29  Such an application required the state to 
notify the local school board of the district where the child resided.30 
After the notification, the superintendent was authorized to make 
such orders as he judged were required by the circumstances, 
including an order that the child attend school in another district.31  
If ordered by the superintendent to attend school in another district, 
the resident district was required by law to pay the child’s tuition to 
the district where the child would now be going to school.32  Today, 
New Hampshire law recognizes a number of exceptions to the 
residency requirement, including the need to place a child with a 
disability not only outside the district, but in a nonpublic school as 
well.33  Most of these exceptions still require the resident district to 
pay the cost of the education.34 
This exception, which grants to the state the authority to 
appropriate revenue from a local district, has its roots in the 
provincial law that not only mandated that a local community hire a 
  
 27. The district’s duty to provide education to its resident students is found in 
section 189:1-a of the New Hampshire Statutes, while the parents’ duty to compel 
their children to attend the school to which they are assigned by the school district 
is found at section 193:1(I).  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 189:1-a, 193:1(I) (2008 & 
Supp. 2009). 
 28. See Act of Apr. 13, 1911, ch. 139, 1911 N.H. Laws 157. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:10 (Supp. 2009). 
 34. See, e.g., id. 
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teacher and maintain a school but also established a fine on the 
selectmen in communities that failed to raise the necessary funds to 
support a teacher or maintain a school when required to do so.35  
This authority is the likely link that initially tied together liability for 
the cost of public education and the residency requirement.  It would 
be nearly a century before that link would be broken by the decision 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 2002.  In 
Manchester School District v. Crisman, the First Circuit’s 
interpretation of the New Hampshire statutes caused a local school 
district to be liable for the education of a student, not because the 
student and parents resided in the district, but because it was where 
they were living when the child was placed in a home for children.36   
It appears that the first chink in the armor of residency is linked 
to the parental duty of compulsory attendance and the exceptions 
that arose from it.  This link may be the key to a fundamental 
understanding of the sequence of public policy initiatives that 
occurred during the twentieth century and into the current century 
concerning parental choice options.  Over the last thirty years, New 
Hampshire has been engaged in these public policy discussions as 
part of a national dialogue about public education.37  The legislature 
has enacted various initiatives to provide some measure of parental 
choice in public education.38  These efforts have been largely 
unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, including the fact that any cost 
associated with these initiatives continued to be the responsibility of 
the resident school district.39  It was not until 2003, when the 
  
 35. Act of Apr. 25, 1721, ch. 3, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 358. 
 36. 306 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 37. Beginning in 1975 and continuing through 2007 the indices of the House and 
Senate Journals for the New Hampshire General Court regularly contain entries for 
the introduction of bills for charter schools and voucher programs that would 
permit parents to choose an alternative to public educations.  Committee records 
and research, in addition to the author’s personal observation, indicate a number of 
other states had enacted or were considering similar initiatives within the same 
time period.  See, e.g., Sara Vitaska, School Choice, 14 LEGISBRIEF 9 (2006) 
(providing a selected review of the history of public school choice). 
 38. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193:3, 194-A (2006). 
 39. Section 194-B:11(I) of the New Hampshire Statutes requires resident school 
districts to pay to a charter school not less than 80 percent of that district’s average 
per-pupil cost when a pupil attended a charter school outside the resident district.  
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legislature authorized a ten-year pilot project that permitted the State 
Board of Education to directly authorize charter school applications 
without any approval at the local level, that New Hampshire finally 
had at least one popular public choice option to compete with the 
resident district public school.40  But the success of this option was 
due, in large measure, to the fact that the state, and not the resident 
school district, paid the cost for students that attended these charter 
schools.41  The state legislature suspended this program in 2007.42  A 
more detailed discussion of public choice options and their history 
appears later in this article.43 
A. Extended Learning Opportunities (ELO) 
Although New Hampshire’s experience with legislatively-
approved options to public education may not be as robust as those 
in other states, one should not conclude that the state lags behind in 
preparing for public education that will meet the needs of students in 
the twenty-first century.  In 1919, the legislature created the State 
Board of Education and invested the board with extraordinary 
authority that has not been amended in ninety years.44  The grant of 
authority reads, in relevant part: “The state board shall have the same 
powers of management, supervision, and direction over all public 
schools in this state as the directors of a business corporation have 
over its business, except as otherwise limited by law.”45 
  
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I).  Records at the New Hampshire Department 
of Education indicate that no district successfully adopted such a provision when it 
was placed on the school district warrant.  See SARAH BROWNING, N.H. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., CHARTERS GRANTED BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION PURSUANT TO 
RSA 194-B:3 1997–2000 (2010) (on file with author) (compiling information from 
charter school applications that came before the State Board of Education). 
 40. Act of July 18, 2003, ch.273, 2003 N.H. Laws 522 (codified as amended at 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:3-a). 
 41. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I)(b). 
 42. Act of June 29, 2007, ch. 263, § 93, 2007 N.H. Laws 301, 331.  In 2009, the 
state legislature renewed the moratorium.  Act of June 30, 2009, ch. 144, § 153, 
2009 N.H. Laws 146, 184. 
 43. See infra Part III.D. 
 44. Compare Act of Mar. 28, 1919, ch. 106, § 5, 1919 N.H. Laws 155, 157–58, 
with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:5 (2008). 
 45. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:5. 
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At the same time, the board was also permitted to set the 
minimum curriculum and education standards for all grades of the 
public school.46  Today, those standards are one part of the code of 
administrative rules for education.47  By statute, these rules have the 
force and effect of law.48  Since the legislature created the State 
Board of Education, they have shared, to some degree, the public 
policy role for public education.49  With some exceptions, it seems 
that the legislature and the state board have each exercised their 
authority in the public policy realm without great acrimony.50  In its 
most recent adoption of rules for setting the minimum standards for 
public school approval, the board permitted local school districts to 
award credit to students for what they defined as ELO.51  These 
opportunities are defined as “the primary acquisition of knowledge 
and skills through instruction or study outside of the traditional 
classroom methodology” and include such options as independent 
study, private instruction, performing groups, internships, 
community service, apprenticeships, and online courses.52 
It is accurate to state that ELOs are, at least at the moment, an 
option in high school and, in some cases, middle school.53  However, 
gains in the status of ELOs among school districts within the state 
can be considered another development that reduces the importance 
  
 46. Act of Mar. 28, 1919 § 5; cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:8(I). 
 47. N.H. CODE R. ED. 306 (Weil 2009) (describing minimum standards for 
public school approval). 
 48. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:22(II) (2007). 
 49. The New Hampshire Constitution, Part II, Article 5 grants full power and 
authority to the General Court to make laws, while in section 186:5 the general 
court grants a broad delegation of this duty for public education to the State Board 
of Education.  Compare N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5, with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
186:5. 
 50. Since section 186:5 has not been amended since it was enacted in 1919, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the power-sharing arrangement between the legislature 
and the State Board of Education has been, for the most part, amicable.  See N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:5; Act of Mar. 28, 1919 § 5.  Were this not the case, the 
legislature could have amended the statute. 
 51. N.H. CODE R. ED. 306.04(a)(13) (requiring school districts to adopt and 
implement a written policy if they choose to offer ELOs). 
 52. Id. at 306.02(c) (providing the definition for ELOs). 
 53. Id. at 306.26(f) (middle school); id. at 306.27(b)(4) (high school).  However, 
there are no provisions for ELOs in elementary grades prior to middle school. 
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of residency.  Any of the ELO options can occur in places outside 
the resident school district, and while a school still remains an 
anchor for the awarding of credit for ELO activity, there is nothing, 
beyond the current residency statute, that ties a student to a school in 
the district where he resides.54  It is not unreasonable to hypothesize 
that a student in the future might be able to seek a school in a 
community where his internship, community service, or 
apprenticeship was located and then develop a plan for an 
independent study coupled with some regular classes at an approved 
high school or adult high school in that community in order to earn a 
school year’s worth of credit or more.  Such options also 
contemplate the acquisition of knowledge and skills from foreign 
travel.  This again demonstrates the inconsequentiality of a residency 
requirement in order to access public education. 
Currently, every ELO must be approved by the school in which 
the student resides and be based on a standard adopted by the local 
school district, if that district chooses to permit students to earn 
credits using the ELO option.55  That is not to say that a local 
approval process must or will always continue to be the only method 
for accessing this option.  Only a lack of capacity at the state level 
prevents the legislature and the state board from considering a public 
policy that would allow a student to apply to the Department of 
Education for approval of an ELO option.  While this is not currently 
contemplated, the theory is not an unimaginable progression from 
where we are today. 
B. Manchester School District v. Crisman 
State law requires the State Board of Education to provide an 
appeal and issue a decision to any individual that disputes a decision 
of a local school system or the Department of Education.56  Over the 
years, the board has heard a number of appeals dealing with the 
residency issue.  A change in the law in 2003 shifted these 
responsibilities to the Commissioner of Education and removed the 
  
 54. See id. at 306.26(f), 306.27(b)(4). 
 55. Id. at 306.04(a)(13). 
 56. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-N:11(III) (2000). 
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board from hearing the appeal of that decision.57  While the 
commissioner’s decisions are not currently published, the prior state 
board decisions are available on the department website.58  The only 
current residency case that has found its way into the judicial system 
is Manchester School District v. Crisman.59  This case has a 
procedural history that spans a decade, beginning with an 
administrative decision in 1992.60  The case involved a child who 
was born in Colorado in September of 1988 and who traveled with 
her parents to Manchester, New Hampshire in January of 1989.61  
While in Manchester, the child was involved in a serious accident 
and sustained permanent injuries.62  The Division of Children and 
Youth Services helped the parents place the child in a group home in 
Pittsfield, New Hampshire.63  The application for placement listed an 
address in Manchester for the parents.64 
The decision articulated the basic difference between the 
residency requirement in section 193:12(I) of the New Hampshire 
Statutes and a determination of which school district was liable for 
the cost of a public education, and expressed great concern regarding 
the wisdom of relying on traditional definitions of residency to 
determine school district liability, at least for the education of 
students with disabilities.65  Based on the Crisman opinion, the 
district where the student resides may not always be the district 
liable for the cost of a student’s elementary or secondary 
  
 57. Act of Aug. 20, 2003, ch. 222, § 2, 2003 N.H. Laws 339, 339–40 (codified as 
amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:12(VI) (Supp. 2009)).  The 
Commissioner’s decision is appealable to a court of competent jurisdiction.  Id.  
The court of competent jurisdiction is the New Hampshire Supreme Court.  N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 541:6 (2007). 
 58. N.H. Dep’t of Educ., State Board Decision by Subject, http://www.ed.state. 
nh.us/education/laws/StateBoardDecisionbySubject.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
 59. 306 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 5.  A redacted version of the administrative decision is available at the 
New Hampshire Department of Education, Office of Legislation and Hearings. 
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. Id. at 5. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Cf. Crisman, 306 F.3d at 11 (“The definition of legal resident contained in 
section 193:12 does not affect the particular statutory provisions on which 
[Manchester School District’s] liability to [the child] turns.”). 
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education.66  The court in Crisman held that the Manchester school 
district was liable for the educational costs of a student with a 
disability who had never established residency in Manchester and 
who, by the time she was old enough to attend school, was living 
and going to school in another New Hampshire school district.67  
The court advanced the premise that the residency requirements in 
the state’s statutes simply limit where a child may go to school; they 
do not address the issue of who is responsible to pay for the 
student’s education.68 
The First Circuit relied on several sections of section 193:12, the 
state’s residency law, and on the provisions of chapter 186-C, the 
state’s special education law, to affirm the district court’s decision.  
The district court’s decision upheld the hearing officer’s 
determination that, despite all of the legal theories advanced by the 
school district, Manchester was the school district responsible to pay 
for the education of the child because the child and her parents were 
living in Manchester at the time that the child was placed in a home 
for children in Pittsfield.69 
In its decision, the court stated that section 193:12, the current 
residency statute, only sets forth where a child may go to school, 
unless the child meets the requirements of one of the exceptions; and 
section 193:12(V) is an exception that requires the determination of 
liability to be made in accordance with section 193:29.70  The court 
also reviewed the language of section 193:27, which states, in 
relevant part that a sending district is “the school district in which 
the child most recently resided other than in a home for children.”71 
The court next relied on a recent New Hampshire Supreme Court 
decision, which held that “most recently resided” meant the place 
where one lived prior to placement in a home for children, regardless 
of residency.72 
  
 66. See id. at 11–13. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 11. 
 69. Id. at 11–13. 
 70. Id. at 12. 
 71. Crisman, 306 F.3d at 11 (emphasis added) (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
193:27(IV) (1999)). 
 72. Id. at 12 (citing In re Gary B., 466 A.2d 929, 932 (N.H. 1983)). 
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Without challenging the merits of the decision by either the First 
Circuit or the New Hampshire Supreme Court, it is still possible to 
observe that the Crisman decision breaks the link between residency 
and liability.  If a liability determination may obligate a school 
district for the expenses of educating a child that is an inhabitant, but 
not a resident, of the district, then the premise of residency as a limit 
on fiscal obligation is severely compromised.  Furthermore, with this 
link between residency and financial liability now broken, this 
decision arguably strengthens the position of the plaintiffs in the 
school funding litigation cases.  If there is no correlation between 
where a student lives and which community pays for a student’s 
education, the notion that it is the state’s responsibility to provide the 
access for all its resident students to get a public education becomes 
more viable.  So, even a correct decision concerning liability may 
have unintended consequences that have the power to undermine the 
stability of an unrelated and long-standing public policy that set out 
residency as the principal factor in determining access to public 
education. 
C. Plyler v. Doe 
On the national level, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed 
residency in a decision that held a 1975 Texas law unconstitutional 
because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by treating children of illegal immigrants differently 
than other children within Texas’s borders.73 
The case of Plyler v. Doe reached the Court by way of two cases 
that challenged the constitutionality of a Texas law involving 
residency: (1) a class action suit from the Eastern District of Texas; 
and, (2) a number of challenges in the Southern District of Texas, 
originating in various parts of the state, that were consolidated 
below.74  On appeal from the decisions of the Fifth Circuit, the U.S. 
Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.75  At issue was a state 
statute that withheld state funds from school districts for the 
education of children that were not legally admitted to the country 
  
 73. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
 74. Id. at 206, 209. 
 75. Id. at 210. 
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and therefore not residents of Texas.76  It also authorized school 
districts to refuse to enroll these children as students in the public 
school system.77  In the class action, the certified class was a group 
of undocumented children of elementary or secondary school age.78 
Texas argued that since they entered Texas illegally, these 
children were not residents of Texas and were not properly within 
the jurisdiction of the state; therefore, they were not entitled to 
access public education and were not entitled to protection under the 
U.S. Constitution.79  Texas also maintained that the statute was a 
financial measure to prevent a drain on the State’s treasury.80  The 
district court held that the state statute was an unconstitutional 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.81  Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court upheld 
the district court’s opinion.82 
Again, what makes this opinion interesting to the analysis 
concerning the relevancy of residency is not the holding or the 
reasoning employed by the various courts to strike down the state 
statute.  What is notable are two of the district court’s findings: (1) in 
the class action case, the court found that the number of illegal 
immigrants seeking to enroll in public schools in Texas was small 
and that the increase in enrollment was attributable, for the most 
part, to children who were legal residents;83 and (2) in the 
consolidated cases, the court found that the state’s concern for fiscal 
integrity was not a compelling state interest.84  It is also interesting 
to note that part of the Supreme Court’s holding extended equal 
protection to the student class on the theory that minors are not held 
responsible for the illegal actions of their parents.85  The Court 
reasoned that it would be fundamentally unfair to disable a child by 
withholding the benefits of public education where the child was 
  
 76. Id. at 205. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 206. 
 79. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. 
 80. Id. at 227. 
 81. Id. at 208. 
 82. Id. at 208–09, 230. 
 83. Id. at 207. 
 84. Id. at 209. 
 85. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219–20. 
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brought to this country by his parents and had no opportunity to cure 
his disability, because as a minor child he could not control the 
actions of his adult parents.86  Again, without debating the validity of 
the Plyler decision, it is apparent that the value of residency as a 
limit on financial responsibility and social obligation are further 
eroded by this decision.  If fiscal integrity is not a compelling state 
interest and students whose parents cannot meet the residency 
requirements of a state law may still access the public education 
system, the rhetorical question must be: what is the value of a 
residency requirement? 
D. Options to Resident District Public School Attendance 
New Hampshire’s experience with school choice options has 
been limited and not entirely successful from the view of those who 
support choice.  With the enactment of the statute that created 
compulsory attendance as a parental duty, the initial choice was for 
the parent to have a child excused from attendance by the local 
district or appeal to the state for a change in school assignment.87 
As of this writing, section 193:3 provides two options for a 
change in school assignment, one based on manifest educational 
hardship, and the other based on best interests of the child.88  It 
should be noted that neither of these options is clearly defined, and 
both require approval by the resident school district and the payment 
of tuition by that district to the district to which the student is re-
assigned.89  This option is infrequently approved, onerous for 
parents, and designed to maintain the status quo of the union of 
residency with liability.90  Although this is not necessarily a 
  
 86. Id. 
 87. Act of Apr. 13, 1911, ch. 139, 1911 N.H. Laws 157. 
 88. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:3 (Supp. 2009). 
 89. Id. § 193:3(I), (III). 
 90. A survey of the recent state board administrative hearings indicates that 
manifest educational hardship is often the basis for appeal of a local school board 
decision.  See N.H. Dep’t of Educ., Laws & Hearing / Mediation, 
http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/laws/StateBoardDecisionbySubject.htm (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2010) (demonstrating that approximately twenty of the eighty-eight 
cases contain “manifest educational hardship” or “hardship” in the description of 
the case).  Since “best interest of the child” decisions cannot be appealed to the 
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satisfactory option for parents, it is still evidence of a public policy 
that is willing to carve out niches in the residency criterion.  In 
addition to this statutory provision, parents willing to pay tuition to 
another public school district have successfully enrolled their 
children in other districts when district policies have permitted 
accepting tuition students.91  In addition, there are some collective 
bargaining agreements with teachers where the employing district 
permits those employees who live outside the district in which they 
teach to enroll their children in the employing district, sometimes at 
a significantly reduced tuition.92  Under current law, a child may be 
excused from attending a public school within the resident school 
district if the child is attending a charter or nonpublic school or is 
enrolled in a home education program.93 
1.  Vouchers and Section 194-A 
The concept of voucher programs is another attack on the 
viability of the residency requirement.  State legislation permits 
school districts to issue vouchers for a specified amount to pay for a 
student’s education in a private school, anywhere in the state, that is 
authorized and willing accept the vouchers.94  While the concept 
undermines local public education, the programs have not had much 
of an effect because they are generally challenged on constitutional 
grounds and because the challenges, to date, have been very 
successful.95  The early voucher legislation provided for the state to 
pay the vouchers directly to the schools.96  Since most of the private 
  
state board, pursuant to section 193:3(III)(h), there is no method, short of 
surveying every school district, to know how often these requests are approved, 
but it is unlikely that the approvals would be more frequent than those for manifest 
educational hardship.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:3(III)(h). 
 91. Statistics are available from the New Hampshire Department of Education, 
Office of Information Services upon request. 
 92. See Judgment of July 20, 2006, No. 06-05-065 (N.H. Dep’t of Educ. July 20, 
2006), http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/laws/0605065.htm. 
 93. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1(I) (2006). 
 94. Act of May 27, 1975, ch. 182, 1975 N.H. Laws 152, repealed by Act of May 
1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65. 
 95. See, e.g., Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 
933, 944 (Colo. 2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 412–13 (Fla. 2006). 
 96. See Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 397. 
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schools that were willing to accept these vouchers were parochial 
schools operated by the Roman Catholic Church, the early 
challenges were based on religious clauses in state constitutions or 
the Establishment Clause of U.S. Constitution.97  Supporters of the 
voucher programs conceived a strategy to get around this 
impediment by having the school district pay the voucher to the 
parent of the student.  The opponents met this challenge by resorting 
to various educational clauses in a state’s constitution.98 
New Hampshire was willing to consider providing vouchers even 
before it statutorily permitted home-schooling and charter schools.  
The impetus for this legislation was a grant from the federal 
government to the New Hampshire Department of Education.99 
The New Hampshire Department of Education received the 
federal grant in the spring of 1973 to develop a model to test an 
unrestricted voucher program.100  The department agreed, on advice 
of counsel, to eliminate sectarian schools from participation due to 
recent Supreme Court rulings.101  In December of 1973, the Attorney 
General’s office encouraged the Department to seek legislation to 
resolve issues that required legislative authority to implement the 
program.102 
In the 1975 legislative session, two voucher bills were filed.103  
The bill requested by the Department was sponsored by a bipartisan 
group of legislators led by the former chairman of the House 
Education Committee and, at the time, the House Majority Leader.104  
  
 97. Martin R. West, School Choice Litigation After Zelman, in FROM 
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 167, 177–78 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009). 
 98. See, e.g., Colo. Cong. of Parents, 92 P.3d at 935; Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 397–
98. 
 99. Act of May 27, 1975, ch. 182, sec.1, § 1, 1975 N.H. Laws 152, 152–53, 
repealed by Act of May 1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65; ROBERT L. 
BRUNELLE, OFFICE OF THE COMM’R, N.H. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NEW 
HAMPSHIRE VOUCHER EXPERIMENT 6 (1976). 
100. BRUNELLE, supra note 99, at 1. 
101. Id. at 6. 
102. Id. 
103. See N.H. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 1137 (1975) (listing H.B. 374 and H.B. 
867). 
104. Id. at 428; THE BROWN BOOK OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE LEGISLATURE 45–46 
(1975).  Additionally, the author was employed by the Office of the Speaker of the 
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H.B. 867, an act providing for the test of education voucher 
programs, became Chapter 182 of the Laws of 1975.105  The other 
bill, H.B. 970—an act providing for partial tuition payments for 
parents of children attending private elementary schools if approved 
by local referendum—was killed by the House.106  The House 
Education Committee report on H.B. 970, which recommended the 
bill as inexpedient to legislate, offered the following: “There is an 
on-going test of the voucher plan in New Hampshire.  The Education 
Committee feels that HB 867 should be supported now and that this 
bill, which would be unconstitutional as written, should not be 
passed.”107 
Chapter 182 was intended to permit a voucher pilot project when 
federal money was available.108  It authorized the Board of 
Education to operate the program and required voter approval by a 
local school district meeting in order to participate in the program.109  
It also contained a section that terminated the authority granted to 
conduct the test as of June 30, 1983.110  It would not take that long 
for the program to fail.  At school district meetings held in March of 
1976, there were six school districts that had articles on their 
warrants to permit them to participate in the voucher program.111  
Not one of them passed.112  The program ended on May 31, 1976.113  
The statute, section 194-A, was repealed in 1986 as part of a bill to 
reauthorize and reorganize the Department of Education, under the 
then-existing sunset provisions of state law.114  The primary 
  
House from 1975–79 and ultimately assigned as research assistant to the House 
Majority Leader and is familiar with the legislative activities during this time 
period. 
105. N.H. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, supra note 103, at 1274. 
106. Id. at 618. 
107. Id. 
108. Act of May 27, 1975, ch. 182, sec. 1, § 1, 1975 N.H. Laws 152, 152–53, 
repealed by Act of May 1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65. 
109. Id. § 2–3. 
110. Id. § 6. 
111. WILLIAM H. MILNE, N.H. DEP’T OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT: NEW HAMPSHIRE 
EDUCATION VOUCHER PROJECT 15 (1976) (on file with author). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 18. 
114. Act of May 1, 1986, ch. 41, § 29, 1986 N.H. Laws 53, 65. 
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opponent of the test project was the New Hampshire chapter of the 
National Education Association (NH-NEA).115 
Despite the Department’s initial intention to exclude sectarian 
schools, legislation was designed to be an unrestricted voucher 
program, and it contained language that stated that the pilot project 
was not intended to aid any particular school or type of school, but 
was intended to aid students.116  This appears to be an attempt to 
satisfy the three-prong Lemon test of (1) offering a general welfare 
benefit to an individual rather than advancing or inhibiting a 
particular religion; (2) serving a legitimate secular purpose; and (3) 
having no excessive entanglements between church and state—a test 
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court four years earlier.117  Since no 
school district elected to participate in the voucher program, it was 
never challenged in court as offensive to either the state constitution 
or the Federal Constitution on any grounds, including violation of 
the Lemon test. 
More recent efforts have not been any more successful.  In 2004, 
the legislature considered two bills related to vouchers.  H.B. 727 
created a committee to study the issue of school choice in New 
Hampshire.118  The study did not result in any changes in choice 
options for parents beyond what already existed.119  The House 
Education Committee referred H.B. 754, which established an 
educational certificate program to allow parental choice in the 
selection of schools for children, to interim study where it died at the 
end of the session.120  There were many opponents to vouchers this 
  
115. BRUNELLE, supra note 99, at 4. 
116. Act of May 27, 1975 sec. 1, § 1. 
117. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
118. Act of June 11, 2004, ch. 204, 2004 N.H. Laws 375. 
119. Section 5 required: “The committee shall report its findings and any 
recommendations for proposed legislation to the senate president, the speaker of 
the house of representatives, the senate clerk, the house clerk, the governor, and 
the state library on or before November 30, 2004.”  Id.  No additional parental 
choice options have been enacted since 2004. 
120. N.H. General Court Bill Status System, Docket of HB 754, http://www. 
gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/bill_docket.aspx?lsr=218&sy=2004&sortoption=&
txtbillnumber=HB754 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Bill Status]. 
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time, including the State and the Department of Education.121  One 
reason for opposition that had not been a factor in 1975 was the 
Claremont school-funding litigation.122  With the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court monitoring the legislative efforts to define and fund 
an adequate education, this was probably not the ideal time to siphon 
off limited state resources to fund any private alternative to public 
education.123 
Both Florida and Colorado have had their voucher programs 
declared unconstitutional by the supreme courts in those states.124  
This may be the one area where state courts are willing to maintain 
the status quo and limit the options for residency-based education.  
Yet this may be due more to the fact that these programs generally 
provide public money to private schools in addition to, or as an 
alternative to, public schools, rather than due to an aversion to 
choice in public education.  It is also interesting to note that the 
voucher statutes in these two states were not struck down based on a 
state constitutional provision requiring the separation between 
church and state.125  This will become evident in the sections dealing 
specifically with the Colorado and Florida educational development.  
However, due to the myriad educational choices already available in 
both states, the Florida and Colorado state court decisions 
invalidating voucher programs have not reinforced residency as a 
  
121. As special assistant to the commissioner and an advisor to the State Board of 
Education, the author has primary responsibility for the legislative agenda of the 
Department of Education and was an active participant in the legislative process of 
the 2004 legislative session. 
122. See Bill Status, supra note 120. 
123. The school funding litigation that began as Claremont School District and its 
progeny have kept the New Hampshire Supreme Court involved in the 
legislature’s efforts to define, determine the cost of, fund, and assess the 
provisions of an adequate education for more than a decade.  See, e.g., 635 A.2d 
1375 (N.H. 1993). 
124. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 944 
(Colo. 2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 412–13 (Fla. 2006). 
125. See Colo. Cong. of Parents, 92 P.3d at 943–44 (finding instead that the 
statute violated the state’s constitutional mandate to empower democratically 
representative school boards, not parents directly, to control public education); 
Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 412 (finding instead that the statute violated the state’s 
constitutional mandate to provide adequate public education). 
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principle for accessing public education.126  In contrast, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, within the same time period, upheld a voucher 
program that had been enacted by the Ohio legislature.127  This 
decision, because of its narrow scope of review, also had no 
discernable effect on residency-based education. 
2.  The Option to Home School 
The next successful choice option enacted in New Hampshire 
was the statute that permitted parents to withdraw their children from 
public school for the purpose of educating them at home.128  Unlike 
the change of school assignment option, the home schooling option 
did not require approval of the local district, although initially a 
school district could challenge a parent’s decision to home school a 
child.129  Home schooling also did not involve an appropriation of 
any state or local tax money.  This legislation was not enacted until 
1990.  The legislative purpose stated:  
The general court recognizes, in the enactment of RSA 193-
A as inserted by section 3 of this act, that it is the primary 
right and obligation of a parent to choose the appropriate 
educational alternative for a child under his care and 
supervision, as provided by law.  One such alternative allows 
a parent to elect to educate a child at home as an alternative 
to attendance at a public or private school, in accordance 
with RSA 193-A.  The general court further recognizes that 
home education is more individualized than instruction 
normally provided in the classroom setting.130 
  
126. See infra Parts IV–V for explicit detail of the choices available to parents 
that do not choose to enroll their children in the public schools in both Florida and 
Colorado. 
127. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
128. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-A:1–10 (2008 & Supp. 2009). 
129. Act of Apr. 28, 1990, ch. 279, sec. 3, § 7, 1990 N.H. Laws 547, 550 (codified 
as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:7 (2008)) (describing the process by 
which a school district may challenge a parent’s decision to home school). 
130. Id. at sec. 2. 
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There must be a participating agent responsible for overseeing 
every home school program.131  The law permits the resident 
superintendent, a non-public school principal, or the Commissioner 
of Education to act as participating agents.132  The Department of 
Education encourages parents to elect the resident superintendent as 
the participating agent in order to foster communication at the local 
level.  This communication can be important if home-schooled 
students wish to participate in co-curricular courses or activities at 
the local elementary or secondary school, which they are permitted 
to do by law.133  It also makes the transition of returning to public 
school easier if the parents choose to terminate the home school 
program or the program is terminated by order of a hearing officer, 
when the child’s annual evaluations for two consecutive years are 
unsatisfactory.134  This policy supports the norm of residency-based 
education, while the choice itself invalidates the value of the norm. 
The ability of a parent to educate a child at home is not only a 
challenge to the residency requirement, but also an assault against 
the entire system of universal public education.  This is not a 
criticism of the home-education model.  It is simply to state the 
fundamental difference between teaching a child one-on-one as 
opposed to in a classroom with twenty or more peers.  It is a basic 
withdrawal from and a repudiation of that state of society created by 
constitutions for the protection of a form of governance that 
guarantees the continued existence of a free society.135  While the 
home school population may reduce the financial impact on the 
system, it is one factor that undermines the ability of a district to 
plan for its needs.  Alone, home education is not a significant factor, 
but it is part of the story. 
  
131. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:4(II). 
132. Id. 
133. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1-c. 
134. See id. § 193-A:6(III) (setting forth a one-year probationary period following 
the first unsatisfactory annual evaluation and revocation, subject to due 
procedures, following the second unsatisfactory annual evaluation). 
135. Cf. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 3 (“When men enter into a state of society, they 
surrender up some of their natural rights to that society, in order to ensure the 
protection of others . . . .”). 
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3.  The Charter School Option 
The last New Hampshire alternative came during the 1995 
legislative session when the charter school law was enacted.136  It 
was a complicated law that required two votes at the local level and 
an approval by the State Board of Education in between.137  
Although the board issued a number of charter certificates, no 
charter schools have opened under this provision.138  It was not until 
the 2003 legislative session that a pilot program was established that 
permitted charter groups to bypass the first local vote and go directly 
to the Board for authorization.139  The pilot program also eliminated 
the greatest obstacle for charter schools, which was the second local 
vote.140  It was this vote that required the local districts to 
appropriate 80 percent of the per-pupil cost to the charter school.141  
No district was ever willing to tax itself to support a charter 
school.142  The pilot program was able to surmount this obstacle 
because the state’s funding mechanism at the time used a formula 
that yielded a statewide per-pupil cost for an adequate education.143  
The legislature simply directed the school districts to pay to the 
charter schools the per-pupil amount for any student who resided in 
  
136. See Act of June 19, 1995, ch. 260, § 6, 1995 N.H. Laws 409, 410–23 
(codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 194-B:1–22 (2008 & Supp. 
2009)). 
137. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 194-B:3(III). 
138. Records at the New Hampshire Department of Education indicate that 
between 1996 and April of 2000, ten communities had adopted the provisions of 
section 194-B:4.  No charter schools have ever opened in any of these school 
districts.  See BROWNING, supra note 39. 
139. See Act of July 18, 2003, ch. 273, § 1, 2003 N.H. Laws 522, 522 (codified as 
amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:3-a). 
140. Id. 
141. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I). 
142. Although the state board approved charters under the local option provided 
in section 194-B of the New Hampshire Statutes, no charter schools have yet 
opened under this provision and all currently existing charter schools have opened 
under the pilot program under section 194-B:3-a and are funded by the state 
pursuant to section 194-B:11.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B; BROWNING, 
supra note 39. 
143. See Act of July 18, 2003 § 2 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 194-B:11(I)). 
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its district but elected to go to a charter school.144  Ultimately, the 
school funding law was amended and the new formula ceased to 
produce a statewide per-pupil cost; the legislature simply fixed an 
amount for an individual charter school education and paid a 
multiple of that amount directly to the charter schools based on their 
enrollment.145  Under the pilot program, the state board approved 
fourteen charter applications, and of those, eleven are currently still 
in operation.146 
By law, all charter schools in New Hampshire are not only public 
schools, but are open-enrollment schools.147  This means that a child 
from any school district in the state may apply to any charter school 
in the state, without regard for whether the charter school is located 
within the resident school district.148  Neither residency nor 
identification of a student as a child with a disability may be 
considered by a charter school when reviewing applications for 
admission.149 
The latest figures for enrollment in New Hampshire indicate that 
students enrolled in charter schools and home-schooling programs 
amount to less than 3% (2.42%) of the total school-age 
population.150  The student enrollment for non-public schools during 
the same time period was at 9 percent, more than three times charter 
school enrollment.151  While the combined total of charter and home-
schooled students is a small percentage of the New Hampshire 
elementary and secondary population, it is because parents can 
  
144. Id. 
145. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:11(I)(b). 
146. N.H. Dep’t of Educ., Approved Charter Schools in New Hampshire, 
http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/doe/organization/curriculum/SchoolApproval/
CharterSchools/ApprovedNHCharterSchools.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
147. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1(III). 
148. Id. § 194-B:1(VI). 
149. See id. §§ 194-B:1(VIII), 8(I). 
150. Percentages calculated from the most recent numbers for fall 2008 through 
2009 enrollment collected by the New Hampshire Department of Education.  See 
N.H. DEP’T OF EDUC., ENROLLMENT BY GRADE 2008–2009, 
http://www.education.nh.gov/data/documents/fall_enroll08_09.pdf [hereinafter 
ENROLLMENT BY GRADE]; N.H. DEP’T OF EDUC., ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
SCHOOL STATISTICS 2008–2009, http://www.education.nh.gov/data/documents/ 
home_school08_09.pdf. 
151. See ENROLLMENT BY GRADE, supra note 150. 
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unilaterally select either one that the options themselves potentially 
disrupt the stability that a residency criterion has traditionally 
provided.  Enrolling students in charter schools and home schooling 
interferes with the planning process and the financial position of the 
district by affecting the state funds it receives.  Private school 
enrollment only exacerbates this instability. 
Even though almost 89 percent of the school-age population 
continues to attend non-charter public schools, not all are enrolled in 
their local school.152  These students, together with students 
receiving elementary and secondary education from non-public and 
charter schools, or being home schooled, raise questions concerning 
the validity of the residency norm.  It is understandable, then, why 
the organizations representing professional educators tend to oppose 
these choices.153  A healthy skepticism is appropriate, but 
discussions regarding changes in public education too often revolve 
around concern for the established system, with speculation 
concerning the consequences of any change and money.  While these 
are laudable and necessary concerns, the primary concern ought to 
be focused on determining what educational delivery system can 
best meet the needs of students in the present, so that they may 
become adults in the future who will be productive members of their 
communities.  The balance is too often tilted toward the status quo. 
4.  The Options Landscape Outside New Hampshire 
New Hampshire’s experience with educational models that offer 
choices different from the default requirement of public education in 
a local school district is not unique.  Circumstances within other 
states may be significantly different and influenced by any number 
of local issues, but like New Hampshire’s experience, many of the 
options in other states began as part of popular, national movements 
  
152. See id. 
153. Legislative records over the years indicate that at various times the New 
Hampshire School Boards Association, the New Hampshire School 
Superintendents’ Association, and NH-NEA have opposed some or all of the 
legislative initiatives relative to charter schools.  See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 727 
Before the H. & S. Comm. Educ., 159th Sess. (N.H. 2004); BRUNELLE, supra note 
99, at 2. 
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that sprung up around the country.154  The establishment of the 
Secretary of Education as a cabinet-level position in 1979 may have 
contributed to increased support for, and the momentum gained by, 
some of these movements.155  
From 1953, when Health, Education, and Welfare became a 
cabinet post, until 1979, when Education was set out as a separate 
entity, it is reasonable to conclude that the staff and resources 
available to education in a shared environment—especially when 
one considers the magnitude of the issues faced by those in the 
health and welfare arena—were not as significant, nor as focused, as 
they have become in the last thirty years.  In addition to the focus 
provided by an executive branch agency with money to fund 
demonstration projects and best practices, Congress has also turned 
its attention to the issue of public education.  Even the U.S. Supreme 
Court has had occasion to affect the public education landscape.156 
Another contributing factor may have been the willingness of 
some courts during the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s and 1970s to 
  
154. See Vitaska, supra note 37. 
155. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Historical Highlights, 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
The Cabinet-level Department of Health, Education and Welfare was 
created under President Eisenhower, officially coming into existence 
April 11, 1953.  In 1979, the Department of Education Organization Act 
was signed into law, providing for a separate Department of Education.  
HEW became the Department of Health and Human Services, officially 
arriving on May 4, 1980. 
Id. 
156. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that 
Ohio’s voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that Equal Protection Clause applies to children of 
illegal immigrants); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(holding that funding of public education need be only rationally based because 
wealth is not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (replacing Everson’s “competing principles” test 
with a three-prong test requiring that: (1) the primary effect is to offer a public 
welfare benefit, (2) the benefit serves a legitimate public purpose, and (3) there is 
no excessive entanglement between church and state); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (creating two competing principles that: (1) no tax can be levied 
to support religious activities or institutions; and (2) governments cannot exclude 
individuals from receiving the benefit of  public welfare legislation due to 
religious preference or lack thereof). 
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order the busing of public school children to schools outside of their 
neighborhoods in order to achieve racially balanced schools within a 
geographical area.157  While this may have contributed to the higher 
cause of a more integrated society, it may nevertheless have 
contributed to the climate that now challenges the primacy of a 
residency requirement as a criterion for access to a public education.  
The question is: “Is a resident-based delivery system for public 
education still justifiable?” 
The next sections will look at some of these choices and how 
they altered the public education in Florida and Colorado, as well as 
how Congress and the Supreme Court have weighed in at the 
national level. 
IV. FLORIDA 
Most people think of Florida as the state where people go to 
retire and enjoy the benefits of a climate that is warm and temperate 
all year, but in 2006, Florida’s median age was 39.9.158  The largest 
population group, at 43.5%, was the 0–34 age group.159  With a total 
population of 18,349,132,160 the school-age population in 2006 was 
almost 15% of the total, or 2,662,701.161  Florida has sixty-seven 
school districts.162  State law permits successful school districts 
maximum flexibility to develop alternatives to the delivery of a 
standard public school education by using atypical delivery 
models.163  The Florida Education Code has one chapter expressly 
devoted to alternatives to traditional public schools.164  The state’s 
public education delivery system is a countywide system, which 
  
157. See, e.g., Busing in an Angry Glare, LIFE, Mar. 3, 1972 at 26 (discussing 
contemporary politics surrounding the busing of public school children in 1972). 
158. EDUC. INFO. & ACCOUNTABILITY SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA 
EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY DATA PROFILES 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.fldoe.org/eias/eiaspubs/word/fecdp0708.doc. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 6. 
161. Id. at 3. 
162. Id. at 5. 
163. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1000.02(2)(e) (West 2009). 
164. Id. §§ 1002.01–.79 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010). 
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maintains and operates public elementary and secondary schools 
throughout the state.165  Florida law allows for the consideration of 
parents’ choice when a student is assigned to a school.166  This 
“controlled open enrollment,” as it is known, theoretically permits a 
student to attend any public school in the county.167 
In addition, parents may home-school students, choose a private 
school at their expense, or select from a number of different charter 
school options.168  As part of its public education delivery system, 
the state also offers a school for deaf and blind students,169 virtual 
schooling,170 a pilot program beginning in the 2008–2009 school 
year that provides high school credit for nationally or state 
recognized industrial certification programs,171 the New World 
School of the Arts,172 and perhaps most controversially, a voucher 
program, known as the “Opportunity Scholarship Program” 
(OSP).173  Districts may also offer single-gender schools.174 
Among the charter options, districts may offer lab schools175 and 
technical career centers.176  Lab schools are partnerships with public 
postsecondary schools that allow the lab schools to focus on a 
fundamental issue or problem identified in the elementary or 
secondary public education system.177  While Florida law permits 
preferences in student selection, it appears that, if feasible, any 
student in the state may attend a particular lab school.178 
The OSP, enacted in 1999, is grounded in the state’s 
accountability statutes, which assign a letter grade from “A” to “F” 
to each public school based on the performance of its students in 
  
165. See id. § 1001.30. 
166. See id. § 1002.31. 
167. Id. 
168. See id. § 1002.20(6). 
169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.36. 
170. Id. § 1002.37. 
171. Id. § 1002.375. 
172. Id. § 1002.35. 
173. Id. § 1002.38, invalidated by Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
174. Id. § 1002.311. 
175. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.32. 
176. See id. § 1002.34. 
177. Id. § 1002.32(2)–(3). 
178. See id. § 1002.32(4). 
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meeting the proficiency standards set by the state.179  This initiative 
“provides that a student who attends or is assigned to attend a failing 
public school may attend a higher performing public school or use a 
scholarship provided by the state to attend a participating private 
school.”180  The Florida Supreme Court ultimately found this 
provision unconstitutional.181  The real distinction of this program 
may be that it served as a model for sanctions set out in No Child 
Left Behind for schools that were identified as schools in need of 
improvement and requiring school choice.182 
A. Bush v. Holmes 
In Bush v. Holmes, parents and organizations challenged the 
constitutionality of the OSP under state school provisions183 and the 
religious freedom provision184 of the Florida Constitution, as well as 
the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.185  The case had a 
long procedural history, from the trial court in Leon County and the 
Florida First District Appellate Court, before it finally got to the 
Florida Supreme Court.186  Under the Florida Constitution, when an 
appellate court declares a state statute unconstitutional, the state 
supreme court is required to review the decision.187 
While this case was on remand in the trial court, the U.S. 
Supreme Court announced that an Ohio voucher program similar to 
the OSP was not unconstitutional.188  The plaintiffs in Holmes then 
dropped their Federal Establishment Clause claim.189 
In a 5-2 decision, the Florida Supreme Court, relying on article 
IX, section 1(a), found that the OSP statute was unconstitutional.190  
  
179. See id. §§ 1002.38, 1008.34. 
180. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 400 (Fla. 2006). 
181. Id. at 412. 
182. See West, supra note 97, at 176. 
183. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 6. 
184. Id. art. I, § 3. 
185. Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 398–99. 
186. Id. at 399. 
187. Id. at 397 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1)). 
188. Id. at 399; see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
189. Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 399. 
190. See id. at 413. 
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Using the state constitution’s education clause, the court found that 
the program undermined the constitutional requirement for the 
provision of a uniform and efficient system of public schools.191  
The majority reasoned that the OSP provided some students an 
alternative to the public education delivery system which 
circumvented the uniformity provisions of article IX, section 1 of the 
Florida Constitution, while diverting state funds for public education 
to a non-public alternative.192 
This decision to some degree limited the choices available to 
students in Florida and maintained the status quo as far as voucher 
programs were concerned, but its effect on strengthening or 
supporting the residency requirement was negligible.  With a 
countywide system of sixty-seven school districts guided by a 
controlled open enrollment provision, and with city and town 
residency non-essential to student placement, all of the other school-
choice options, even without a voucher program, drastically diminish 
the effect of residency in determining school assignment. 
V. COLORADO 
Colorado, which gained statehood on August 1, 1876, is divided 
into sixty-four counties, and in 2005 had an estimated population of 
4,665,177.193  Its public education laws bear a general similarity to 
those in other states.194  In 1887, thirteen years after Colorado 
became the thirty-eighth state in the Union, a residency requirement 
for public education was enacted.195  Although this law remains on 
the books, more recent legislative enactments have emasculated the 
general provisions of section 22-1-102 of the Colorado Revised 
Statutes.  The state’s delivery system appears to have been at one 
  
191. See id. at 412. 
192. See id. 
193. Infoplease.com, Colorado: History, Geography, Population, and State Facts, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108189.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
194. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-504 (West 2005), with FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 1002.33 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010). 
195. 1887 Colo. Sess. Laws 301 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-1-102). 
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time organized and maintained at the county level.196  Legislation 
enacted in 2008 reorganized the educational delivery system into 
twelve regional service areas in order to coordinate the services of 
178 school districts, fifty-seven administrative units, and twenty-one 
cooperative service boards.197  In considering this reorganization, it 
is clear that legislators were mindful of the state’s constitutional 
requirement to provide a “thorough and uniform system of free 
public schools.”198 
The Colorado Department of Education describes the state as an 
“educational choice state.”199  On its website, the department lists 
charter schools, home schooling, private school, and “other” as 
options.200  Charter schools in Colorado, as in other states, are 
considered public schools.201  Yet, it is in the “other” category that 
one finds a significant number of public options. 
The first is an open enrollment provision that began in 1990, like 
Florida’s, as a controlled open enrollment to provide choice within 
the district.202  By the 1994–1995 school year, Colorado law required 
statewide open enrollment.203  The provision even permitted a school 
district to deny a request from a resident student to attend a 
particular school within the district for a variety of reasons.204  
Despite the fact that Colorado’s residency law is still valid, this 
provision is arguably the most significant state attack on the 
relevancy of a local residence requirement.  It appears to signal a 
possible shift from the traditional local focus for providing public 
education to a more statewide focus. 
Colorado’s history suggests the state has always been the 
dominant force in public education.  Since its adoption in 1876, 
article IX, section 2 of the state’s constitution has required the 
  
196. See id. §§ 22-4-101 to 105 (repealed 1984). 
197. Id. § 22-5.5-102(2)–(3). 
198. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
199. Colo. Dep’t of Educ., Schools of Choice, http://www.cde.state.co.us/choice/ 
index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
200. Id.  
201. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-103(2). 
202. Id. § 22-36-101(1)(a). 
203. Id. § 22-36-101(1)(b). 
204. Id. § 22-36-101(3). 
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general assembly of the state to provide a public school system.205  
The state’s supreme court reinforced the state’s authority in 1952 
when it held that school districts were a subdivision of the state, and 
the general assembly could abolish them at will.206 
The other public options include on-line learning, magnet 
schools, school programs, and schools-within-a-school.207  The last 
three are alternatives developed and offered by school districts.208  
The magnet schools focus on a particular content area, such as law-
themed education.209  School programs focus on special issues and 
may be located somewhere other than on a school campus, such as 
an educational program for students with recurring disciplinary 
issues.210  Finally, schools-within-a-school are available on a school 
campus, such as the International Baccalaureate program.211  The 
state also provides a school for the deaf and blind.212 
A. Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents 
Once again, the Colorado legislature enacted a voucher program 
that permitted parents to choose non-public schools while using 
public funds.213  The money was provided to the parents of children 
who qualified based on the requirements of the program, known as 
the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program (COCP 
program).214  The statute was aimed at students in the highest 
poverty schools, whose performance ratings were either low or 
unsatisfactory.215 
  
205. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
206. See Hazlet v. Gaunt, 250 P.2d 188, 194 (Colo. 1952). 
207. Colo. Dep’t of Educ., Schools of Choice, Other School Options in Colorado, 






212. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-80-102 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009). 
213. See Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 936 
(Colo. 2004) (discussing the creation of the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot 
Program). 
214. See id. 
215. See id. 
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In Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents, Teachers, and 
Students, the plaintiffs cited eight claims of unconstitutionality, three 
of which involved arguments concerning separation of church and 
state, using public funds for sectarian purposes, and the free exercise 
of religion.216  The trial court found that the law violated article IX, 
section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which states:  
The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization 
of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall 
be established a board of education, to consist of three or 
more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the 
district.  Said directors shall have control of instruction in the 
public schools of their respective districts.217 
Colorado has a statute that permits the state supreme court to 
review a trial court decision whenever a trial court declares a state 
statute unconstitutional.218  Article IX, section 15 was in the original 
constitution and has been the basis of the court’s analysis numerous 
times.219  Here, the court upheld the trial court decision, finding that 
control over instruction was meaningless without control over 
funding.220 
Once again, the court maintained the status quo without relying 
on constitutionally prohibited entanglements between the state and 
sectarian elementary and secondary schools.  Yet again, the decision 
was not pertinent to the effect on the residency requirement because 
of the broad application of choice options within the state. 
  
216. See id. at 936 & n.3 (listing plaintiffs claims at length). 
217. Id. at 937 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15). 
218. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-102(1)(b) (West 2005). 
219. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); 
Hazlet v. Gaunt, 250 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1952); Bagby v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 528 P.2d 
1299 (Colo. 1974); Sch. Dist. No. 16 v. Union High Sch. No. 1, 152 P. 1149 
(Colo. 1915). 
220. See Colo. Cong. of Parents, 92 P.3d at 943. 
File: Browning-Finalv.3.doc Created on:  6/20/10 4:46 PM Last Printed: 6/20/10 4:46 PM 
332 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 8, No. 3 
VI. THE FEDERAL ROLE 
A. McKinney-Vento Act 
Earlier it was suggested that the creation of the U.S. Department 
of Education has led to more activity in the area of public education 
by federal actors.  The McKinney-Vento Act is one piece of 
evidence to support this claim.221  It was enacted in 1987 for the 
laudable purpose of permitting homeless children and 
unaccompanied youth to access public education, despite the fact 
that they or their parents might not be able to establish residency 
anywhere.222  The law further requires that states that have barriers 
to homeless children and unaccompanied youth enrolling in a public 
school must work to remove those barriers.223  It is difficult to 
imagine a more compelling federal directive diminishing the role of 
a residency requirement that would be consistent with the states’ 
rights protection provided by the U.S. Constitution.224 
B. No Child Left Behind 
Another example of federal activity is the 2002 Congressional 
enactment known as No Child Left Behind.225  This legislation was 
initiated due to a growing concern that our nation’s students could 
not compete in a global society and as a way to require more 
accountability from the public education system to address this 
concern.226  The law did all that and more.  It was an overhaul of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act that was enacted in 
  
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435 (2006). 
222. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance (McKinney-Vento) Act, Pub. L. 
No. 100-77, § 721, 101 Stat. 482, 525 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
11431). 
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 11432(d)(2). 
224. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
225. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941). 
226. See id. (listing the full title as: “An Act to close the achievement gap with 
accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind”). 
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1965.227  Since 1979, Congress has tinkered with the provisions of 
that act on an almost annual basis.  Several reauthorizations were 
significant, but this reauthorization was profound.228  It continued 
the framework for grading school districts based on how their 
students performed on a statewide annual assessment, but now 
required states to disaggregate student results based on race, English 
proficiency, student poverty, and disability.229  No longer would the 
high-performing students be able to carry those students that were 
not proficient in meeting the grade-level expectations of the 
curriculum.  This disaggregation of test scores identified, for the first 
time, the traditionally low-performing students that public education 
systems were “leaving behind,” and imposed progressive sanctions 
over time if schools and districts did not improve all student 
performance, as measured by the annual assessment.230   
The new law required states to impose a variety of sanctions on 
those schools and districts designated as “in need of improvement,” 
including the obligation to offer students the choice of another public 
school that is not in need of improvement.231  It also favored the 
development of charter schools.232  While these measures are 
designed to improve public education for all students, they do so 
without regard to residency requirements.  The option of choice for a 
student in a school in need of improvement is, in essence, a voucher, 
albeit limited to another public school that is not in need of 
improvement.  It seeks to move whole school populations out of 
their neighborhood schools, thus affecting the balance in building 
capacity and transportation schedules, and increasing budgets due to 
the districts’ need to transport children out of their neighborhood 
schools.  In general, charter schools are open enrollment schools, so 
their influence on residency can potentially be experienced 
statewide.  Additionally, every dollar invested by the federal 
government on charter schools is a dollar that is not spent to improve 
  
227. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 
Stat. 27. 
228. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 note (containing a number of amendments). 
229. See id. § 6311. 
230. See id. § 6316; 34 C.F.R. § 200.35–.53 (2009). 
231. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E). 
232. See id. § 7221. 
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schools that have already been classified as “needing improvement.”  
The point is that the public policy enacted at the federal level, 
designed to improve public education, is undercutting the resident-
based delivery system that state laws mandate.  This contradiction 
has caused more conflict among public school advocates rather than 
promoting a thoughtful discussion of reform.233 
C. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Ohio voucher 
program did not violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution when it provided vouchers to parents of students in a 
failing school district, even when those vouchers could be used at 
private, sectarian schools.234  This is one court case that did not find 
a voucher program unconstitutional.  A court decision upholding a 
voucher program that permits students to use public money to go to 
private school, especially a private sectarian school, would strike at 
the heart of a residency requirement.  However, Zelman’s effect on 
eroding the residency requirement was not nearly as significant as it 
would have been if its holding were given a broader scope.  The 
holding preserved the public policy adopted by the Ohio legislature, 
but only as it pertained to the Establishment Clause.235  This left the 
states in the position to have their voucher programs challenged on a 
variety of state constitutional grounds.  Additionally, the voucher 
program itself is limited only to Cleveland because it is the only 
school district in Ohio that meets all of the requirements of the 
statute.236 
  
233. In 2002, when No Child Left Behind went into effect, associations of 
education professionals, as well as some state governors, legislators, and 
departments of education openly rebelled.  There were threats that states would 
refuse federal money.  In New Hampshire, there were several legislative initiatives 
that attempted to remove the state from the federal entanglement or at least limit 
the affect of the new federal law.  One example of a successful initiative is section 
193-H:5 of the New Hampshire Statutes.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H:5 
(2008). 
234. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002). 
235. See id. at 662–63. 
236. Id. at 644–45. 
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Those challenging school voucher programs to private schools 
continue to be successful by raising other state constitutional claims.  
Both Holmes and Colorado Congress of Parents were litigated after 
Zelman, but the voucher programs were struck down as violations of 
the education clauses rather than the religion clauses of those states’ 
constitutions.237  Martin West states that vouchers, along with tax 
credits and charter schools, “threaten the district-based system of 
education provision that has long been dominant in the United 
States.”238  This system maintains its existence primarily by its 
reliance on state residency statutes. 
VII. THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
The national phenomenon known as “school finance litigation” is 
the linchpin of the seemingly unrelated statutory enactments and 
judicial decisions that have diminished the importance of the 
residency requirement as the entry point in public education, and the 
rapid technological advances in the last generation that will continue 
to challenge the legitimacy of the residency requirement.  On one 
side of the school-funding challenges is the natural progression of 
public education, established through public-policy decisions 
adopted by state and federal legislative enactments, with refinements 
by judicial decisions.  On the other side is society’s entry into a 
world where communication is immediate and intelligent machines 
replace people in the workforce.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the impact of this phenomenon on the residency 
requirement. 
Forty-six American states have been a party in school finance 
litigation.239  The four states that have not been a part of this public 
education experience are Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah.240  
  
237. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 
2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
238. West, supra note 97, at 168. 
239. John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM 
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION, supra note 97, at 96, 96. 
240. Id. at 112 n.1. 
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The litigation can be categorized into three phases.241  In the first 
phase, the plaintiffs’ cases were rooted in the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause and advanced the theory that equal protection 
meant equal funding.242  These cases were not successful. 243  Federal 
courts were not anxious to enter a realm where local control and 
states’ rights were the dominant response.244  The second phase 
moved to state courts and states’ equal protection clauses.245  These 
cases were somewhat more successful.246  State courts were not 
always as concerned about the realm of local control.247  After all, 
school districts are political subdivisions of the state, and as such 
have only such power and authority as is granted by the state.248 
It was not until the third phase that school-funding litigation 
finally was more successful and had a greater influence on state 
funding decisions concerning public education.249  In this phase, 
plaintiffs relied on state constitutional education clauses to support 
the theory that state-financing systems did not deliver an adequate 
education for each child in the public education system.250  The most 
notable, albeit relatively modest, effect of all the phases of school 
funding litigation is that it has centralized the funding of public 
education at the state level.251  The consequence of this shift, 
whether intended or unintended, is to further and irreparably 
diminish the importance of residency in a local school district in 
order to access public education. 
Some anticipate that the next phase of litigation will be a return 
to the federal courts with claims based on the Citizenship and 
  
241. Id. at 96. 
242. Id. at 96–97. 
243. See id. at 97. 
244. See id. 
245. Dinan, supra note 239, at 97. 
246. See id. at 97–98. 
247. See id. 
248. School districts, like cities, towns, and other political subdivisions, are 
creatures of the state.  They only have the enumerated powers granted to them by 
the state constitution or through legislative enactments.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
249. See Dinan, supra note 239, at 98. 
250. Id. 
251. See id. at 101–02, 105. 
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Enforcement Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.252  The theory of this 
challenge is that the Equal Protection Clause requires that all 
children in the country have access to an adequate education and the 
Enforcement Clause grants Congress the authority to enforce that 
access.253  The obstacle to success may be the fact that education is 
not yet considered to be a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution.254  Therefore, a state only needs to show a rational 
basis for its financing system.255  If a new round of cases based on 
this premise can clear this hurdle, one might anticipate a result 
similar to the state adequacy cases, where the most notable result 
may be a shift in funding public education to the federal government.  
Such a shift would effectively remove local control, along with its 
residency requirement, from any significant role in public education. 
Unlike Colorado and Florida, New Hampshire is one of the states 
where plaintiffs’ successful efforts have caused several changes in 
the state’s funding model and caused at least one state supreme court 
justice to suspect that the state was not adequately funding public 
education.256  In 1978, Colorado plaintiffs sued in state court 
claiming the state’s financing plan was unconstitutional because it 
violated the equal protection clause of both the Colorado and U.S. 
Constitutions.257  The court held that neither constitution established 
education as a fundamental right and the legislature was not required 
to establish a central public school financing system that restricted 
each school district to equal expenditures per student.258  The Florida 
adequacy case came towards the end of phase three, when courts 
  
252. See id. at 109. 
253. See id. at 109–110. 
254. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). 
255. See id. at 40. 
256. See Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 998 (N.H. 
2006) (Duggan, J., concurring specially in part and dissenting in part).  In the 
concurrence and dissent, Justice Duggan suggested that what the legislature 
appropriated for the cost of an adequate education was not based on the actual 
cost, but a pre-determined number.  Id. at 996.  That implies that the distribution 
formula was backed into based on the numbers and how much to send to each of 
the school districts.  See id. 
257. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1010 n.1, 1014 (Colo. 
1982). 
258. See id. at 1016, 1018, 1025. 
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were not so anxious to get involved in the school funding cases due 
to the protracted nature of the cases and the prospect of being asked 
to make public policy decisions that were best left to the realm of the 
legislative branch.259  The court held that the plaintiffs had not 
articulated “an appropriate standard for determining ‘adequacy’ that 
would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the 
powers and responsibilities assigned to the legislature.”260 
VIII. THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER INITIATIVES 
On the other side of school finance litigation is the world of the 
Information Age.  Once again, our society is experiencing a 
fundamental shift in our economy that suggests the need for 
substantial changes in the methods for participating in this new age.  
The current difficulties due to economic changes are not unlike 
difficulties faced by past societies, such as the move from an 
agrarian economy into the age of the Industrial Revolution.  As we 
attempt to understand how we will function in this new economy, 
and as we deal with a growth in technology that is perhaps greater 
than any other generation has known, it should be apparent that such 
changes will require new knowledge and skills.  This requirement is 
likely to alter both the content and the delivery system of public 
education in our nation.  Even now, technology is providing new 
methods for providing education in our current system.261  New 
initiatives and partnerships will likely also contribute to the 
discussions concerning public policy changes in public education. 
A. Virtual Learning 
Virtual learning is a delivery system in which student learning 
takes place at a computer.  These programs are structured, provide 
rigorous academic content, involve certified teachers, and may be 
  
259. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 
400, 408 (Fla. 1996). 
260. Id. 
261. See generally LUCINDA GRAY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATIONAL 
TECHNOLOGY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS: FALL 2008 (2009), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010003.pdf. 
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synchronous, asynchronous, or both.  The thought of an elementary 
or secondary school student receiving an education by sitting at a 
computer could not have been imagined by today’s “Baby Boomers” 
or their parents, yet there are a number of states where the public 
education delivery system includes this option.262  Both Colorado 
and Florida have statutes that add virtual learning to their mix of 
public school choice.263  In New Hampshire, there is a charter school 
that offers only virtual learning to its students.264 
B. Competition in a Global Economy 
The advances in technology have affected more than public 
education.  Our world has shrunk to the point where an event 
anywhere in the world can be communicated almost instantly to all 
parts of the planet.  Employees may be permitted to work at home 
because of the advances in communication and supporting 
technology.  It is possible to provide video and audio connections so 
that people in multiple locations, anywhere in the world, can meet 
and work on a business issue from their own office, rather than each 
of them commuting to a single destination.  In order for present-day 
students to compete in this rapidly growing technological 
environment, our public education system may require a 
reconfiguration of both the curriculum and the delivery system to 
prepare our students for a promising future in the Information Age.  
This will require new thinking about the entire public policy 
dimension of public education at the national and state levels. 
C. Common Core Standards 
In June of 2009, forty-nine states and territories agreed to 
participate in an initiative co-sponsored by the National Governors 
Association (NGA) and the Council of Chief State School Officers 
  
262. See, e.g., id. at tbls.6, 7, & B-2. 
263. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.7-101 (West Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1002.415 (West 2009). 
264. Virtual Learning Academy, Charter School, http://www.vlacs.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2010). 
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(CCSSO).265  The purpose of this initiative is to develop common 
core standards in English-language arts and mathematics for all 
public schools.266  It is important to note that participation in this 
project does not obligate any state to adopt the standards that are 
developed by the project.267  There is some indication that the 
current Federal Department of Education may use these standards as 
one benchmark for evaluating state applications for at least some 
federal program funding.268  Projects such as this one support a 
possible shift toward the centralization of responsibility for public 
education away from the local level and toward the state level.  
Ultimately, such initiatives may cause a further shift away from the 
states and toward the centralization of public education at the federal 
level.  Either shift diminishes the justification for a resident-based 
public education delivery system. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The effects of statutory changes, school funding litigation, and 
technology and current initiatives appear to converge in a paradigm 
shift away from the traditional local control and resident-based 
delivery of public education, and toward a more centralized system 
at either the state or national level.  The first victim of this shift is the 
traditional requirement that children attend the public schools in the 
district where they reside. 
As the economic foundation of a society shifts, public education 
must also evolve.  Those living in an agrarian economy did not 
require much education because they relied on all able-bodied 
persons to engage in farm work as the basis for economic support.  
At that time, school schedules were designed to be compatible with 
the times in a day and the seasons of the year when children could 
attend school without neglecting their obligations to the farm and 
  
265. Press Release, Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Forty-Nine States and Territories Join 
Common Core Standards Initiative (June 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.corestandards.org (click “More news releases” on left; click link to 
June 1, 2009 news release). 
266. See id. 
267. See id. 
268. See Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,803, 37,806 (July 29, 2009). 
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family.  The shifts to an industrial economy and then to a service 
economy have both required society to significantly alter the 
curriculum and delivery of public education.  As we now 
contemplate yet another shift into a global and technological 
economy, it is time to reconsider our current curriculum and delivery 
models in public education.  One of the first criteria we should be 
ready to discard is the tenacious reliance on local residency in order 
to gain access to the public education system. 
The residency requirement is not the most significant substantive 
element of reform in public education, but it is arguably the most 
important procedural element.  It is the first and most difficult barrier 
to critical thinking regarding the status quo.  It may also be the one 
that is the most problematic, at least initially, to overcome. 
In his article on state school finance litigation, John Dinan 
concludes that traditional reliance on local governance and funding 
of public education is unlikely to be displaced or significantly altered 
by school-finance litigation.269  That conclusion may be accurate 
from a limited focus on school financing litigation, itself.270  
However, when school finance litigation is viewed along with state 
and federal court decisions, statutes in areas of public education 
(such as public choice, vouchers, and other alternatives), and rapidly 
expanding technology that creates a significantly different global 
economy, the reliance on local governance and a residence-based 
delivery system is certainly debatable.  Today, it may be more 
apparent that a paradigm shift is in the making.  At the moment, it 
appears that such a shift favors increased responsibility for 
governance and, therefore, funding of public education at the state 
level, or perhaps even the federal level. 
Ultimately, the shift may be toward the federal government.  If a 
new round of school finance litigation that relies on challenges at the 
federal court level based on the Citizenship and Enforcement 
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution are successful, there may be less 
discrepancy in funding across the states.  New partnerships like the 
current NGA and CCSSO initiative to develop common core 
standards in public education aim to level the disparity among states 
  
269. Dinan, supra note 239, at 112. 
270. See id. 
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concerning what students learn in order to provide an education that 
prepares all students for postsecondary education or work.271  A 
recent article by Russ Whitehurst, Senior Fellow at the Brown 
Center, indicates that it is curriculum that is of primary importance 
in education and assessment.272  Does all of this suggest that a 
national curriculum is necessary for a twenty-first century 
education?  Do these factors support a public education system that 
is not driven by student residence? 
A holistic analysis and discussion regarding significant changes 
in our traditional public education system will be emotionally 
charged, and until now it has been largely been avoided in this 
country.  The question is, can we continue this avoidance in the 
wake of a potential paradigm shift?  Common wisdom suggests that 
the forthcoming reauthorization of NCLB is likely to continue and 
perhaps strengthen the provisions that support public choice and 
charter schools.  While all of these endeavors may be part of a new 
public education system, they are inconsistent with local autonomy 
and create a situation where the criterion of local residency is 
increasingly less relevant. 
This analysis takes no position on whether such a paradigm shift, 
whether at the state or federal level, is desirable.  Its purpose is to 
simply raise awareness to the existence of such a shift, so that public 
policy makers at all levels may consider the intended and potentially 
unintended consequences of the seemingly unrelated changes that 
are occurring in public education at both the state and national level.  
This heightened state of awareness will permit state and federal 
legislators and state boards of education to weigh the options in an 
integrated, global context, rather than as isolated and individual 
elements of a system.  In this manner, public-policy makers will be 
able to move toward a goal that will provide every child with access 
to a twenty-first century education, no matter where in America that 
child lives.  Better partnerships among the local, state, and federal 
actors and stakeholders are needed to support a model that first 
values student learning and then considers cost as one of the first 
  
271. See Press Release, supra note 265. 
272. See GROVER J. WHITEHURST, DON’T FORGET THE CURRICULUM (2009), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/1014_curriculum_whitehurst. 
aspx. 
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elements of this new conversation.  In such a model, the first 
question may be: “Does where a student lives determine what public 
education that student may access?”  That answer should be: “No.” 
While residency may continue to be cited as an important factor 
for planning, if the costs shift from local districts to a state or the 
federal government, the reduced fiscal obligations of a local district 
make residency within a particular school district less important.  
The residency argument may also be less important with the growth 
in virtual learning, charter schools, and other publicly financed, 
alternative-education programs that are available to students.  If 
where a student lives is no longer relevant to the education a student 
may access, how will we as a society make the transition from a 
standard that we have relied on for more than three centuries?  This 
should be the next public policy discussion in public education 
around the country. 
Looking at Florida, Colorado, and New Hampshire provides 
evidence that a delivery model for public education is currently less 
driven by residency and more focused on innovation and change.  
The final question is: Will the residency requirement in public 
education be repealed as part of a thoughtful, orderly transition, or 
will it simply become so irrelevant as to be ignored?  The latter will 
be the case if we continue the current scheme of “tinkering” with the 
public education system.  To simply react to emerging issues with 
amendments to the existing structure avoids the more difficult 
process of large-scale reform.  Yet, paradigm shifts frequently 
require such reform. 
For New Hampshire, and states similarly situated, a tradition of 
strict adherence to the doctrine of local control will impede the 
process of a thoughtful, orderly reform of the public education 
system.  While there is nothing inherently detrimental in the notion 
of local control, it does not guarantee either the most efficient use of 
resources or the best results.  In the case of public education, local 
control is not historically justifiable.  Initially, it was the provincial 
government, the forerunner of the state, that mandated the creation 
of a public education system and fined selectmen that neglected the 
mandate.273  When preparing to enter statehood, it was the framers of 
  
273. See Act of Apr. 25, 1721, ch. 3, 1702–1745 N.H. Laws 358. 
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the New Hampshire Constitution that, out of their support for state 
encouragement of education and state funding for schools, drafted a 
specific article that obligated the state to implement their concept.274  
The article was ratified by the voters of the period.275  This article 
and the history surrounding its adoption were the basis for the state 
supreme court to find that the provision of an adequate education 
was a state responsibility.276  The ability of the state to delegate 
some of its duties to its political subdivisions never relieves the state 
of its primary obligation.  Additionally, there is another provision in 
the New Hampshire Constitution that shares the same history 
without amendment as part II, article 83, and that is part I, article 3, 
which states in relevant part: “When men enter into a state of 
society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that society 
. . . .”277  This is not a history that supports the notion of local 
control.  Instead of continuing the power struggle between the state 
and local school districts, perhaps a better partnership between the 
two would create the climate in which the conversations concerning 
large-scale reform could begin. 
It appears that the doctrine of local control is not a major 
impediment to such discussions in states like Florida and Colorado.  
This may be because neither state emerged directly out of the 
American colonial experience, or because these states invested 
county governance with more power and authority than states like 
New Hampshire did, or it may be due to some other reason 
altogether.  Whatever the reason, it appears that these states find it 
easier to embrace change and offer more alternatives in public 
education.  While this does not exempt these states from the reform 
conversations, it is likely that these conversations will occur sooner 
and produce noticeable results earlier. 
None of this is to suggest that reform in any state will be easy or 
happen quickly.  In fact, a thoughtful, orderly transition argues 
against wholesale, rapid reform.  The point is: it is time for 
meaningful dialogue to begin.  Remaining firmly entrenched in the 
past and wrapped in the cloak of our sacred traditions is not in the 
  
274. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
275.  Id. pt. II, art. 83, annots. 
276. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993). 
277. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 3. 
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best interest of our children.  While systemic reform does not require 
that we abandon all elements of our current system, it does require 
that we enter into conversations without a preconceived adherence to 
any particular element, and with a willingness to analyze existing 
elements, along with new elements, and choose those, whether old or 
new, that will provide the best public education system we can offer 
to all children.  We cannot afford to do less. 
During the last century, public education evolved slowly, with 
changes caused by federal and state legislative enactments and 
judicial decisions.  This process was appropriate for an era when all 
change, even economic and social change, was incremental.  That 
era has ended.  We now find ourselves in an era where change is 
constant and immediate, and our society is more global than local.  
This era will create new opportunities that will require knowledge 
and skills that are unlike those of the past in some respects.  Success 
will be achieved by those, whether at the local, state, or national 
level, that meet the challenge of this new era by providing the 
educational system that produces men and women who are prepared 
for the opportunities in a global community. 
